Wednesday, July 26, 2006

Nice Rats, Nasty Rats: Maybe It’s All in the Genes - New York Times

Nice Rats, Nasty Rats: Maybe It’s All in the Genes - New York Times

July 25, 2006

Nice Rats, Nasty Rats: Maybe It’s All in the Genes

On an animal-breeding farm in Siberia are cages housing two colonies of rats. In one colony, the rats have been bred for tameness in the hope of mimicking the mysterious process by which Neolithic farmers first domesticated an animal still kept today. When a visitor enters the room where the tame rats are kept, they poke their snouts through the bars to be petted.

The other colony of rats has been bred from exactly the same stock, but for aggressiveness instead. These animals are ferocious. When a visitor appears, the rats hurl themselves screaming toward their bars.

“Imagine the most evil supervillain and the nicest, sweetest cartoon animal, and that’s what these two strains of rat are like,” said Tecumseh Fitch, an animal behavior expert at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland who several years ago visited the rats at the farm, about six miles from Akademgorodok, near the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. Frank Albert, a graduate student at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, is working with both the tame and the hyperaggressive Siberian strains in the hope of understanding the genetic basis of their behavioral differences.

“The ferocious rats cannot be handled,” Mr. Albert said. “They will not tolerate it. They go totally crazy if you try to pick them up.”

When the aggressive rats have to be moved, Mr. Albert places two cages side by side with the doors open and lets the rats change cages by themselves. He is taking care that they do not escape to the sewers of Leipzig, he said.

The two strains of rat are part of a remarkable experiment started in the former Soviet Union in 1959 by Dmitri K. Belyaev. Belyaev and his brother were geneticists who believed in Mendelian theory despite the domination of Soviet science by Trofim Lysenko, who rejected Mendelian genetics.

Belyaev’s brother was exiled to a concentration camp, where he died, but Belyaev was able to move to Siberia in 1958 and became director of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics in Novosibirsk. There he was able to study genetics in relative freedom, according to a report prepared by Dr. Fitch after a visit to the institute in 2002.

Belyaev decided to study the genetics of domestication, a problem to which Darwin gave deep attention. Domesticated animals differ in many ways from their wild counterparts, and it has never been clear just which qualities were selected for by the Neolithic farmers who developed most major farm species some 10,000 years ago.

Belyaev’s hypothesis was that all domesticated species had been selected for a single criterion: tameness. This quality, in his view, had dragged along with it most of the other features that distinguish domestic animals from their wild forebears, like droopy ears, patches of white in the fur and changes in skull shape.

Belyaev chose to test his theory on the silver fox, a variant of the common red fox, because it is a social animal and is related to the dog. Though fur farmers had kept silver foxes for about 50 years, the foxes remained quite wild. Belyaev began his experiment in 1959 with 130 farm-bred silver foxes, using their tolerance of human contact as the sole criterion for choosing the parents of the next generation.

“The audacity of this experiment is difficult to overestimate,” Dr. Fitch has written. “The selection process on dogs, horses, cattle or other species had occurred, mostly unconsciously, over thousands of years, and the idea that Belyaev’s experiment might succeed in a human lifetime must have seemed bold indeed.”

In fact, after only eight generations, foxes that would tolerate human presence became common in Belyaev’s stock. Belyaev died in 1985, but his experiment was continued by his successor, Lyudmila N. Trut. The experiment did not become widely known outside Russia until 1999, when Dr. Trut published an article in American Scientist. She reported that after 40 years of the experiment, and the breeding of 45,000 foxes, a group of animals had emerged that were as tame and as eager to please as a dog.

As Belyaev had predicted, other changes appeared along with the tameness, even though they had not been selected for. The tame silver foxes had begun to show white patches on their fur, floppy ears, rolled tails and smaller skulls.

The tame foxes, Dr. Fitch reported, were also “incredibly endearing.” They were clean and quiet and made excellent house pets, though — being highly active — they preferred a house with a yard to an apartment. They did not like leashes, though they tolerated them.

American researchers have suggested that the foxes be made available as pets, partly to ensure their survival should the Novosibirsk colony be wiped out by disease.

“There was a time when Soviet science was in a desperate state and Belyaev’s foxes were endangered,” said Ray Coppinger, a dog biologist at Hampshire College in Massachusetts who tried to obtain some of the foxes to help preserve them. But the animals seem to have left Russia only once, for Finland, in a colony that no longer survives.

There was far more to Belyaev’s experiment than the production of tame foxes. He developed a parallel colony of vicious foxes, and he started domesticating other animals, like river otters and mink. Realizing that genetics can be better studied in smaller animals, Belyaev also started a study of rats, beginning with wild rats caught locally. His rat experiment was continued after his death by Irina Plyusnina. Siberian gray rats caught in the wild, bred separately for tameness and for ferocity, have developed these entirely different behaviors in only 60 or so generations.

The collection of species bred by Belyaev and his successors form an unparalleled resource for studying the process and genetics of domestication. In a recent visit to Novosibirsk, Dr. Brian Hare of the Planck Institute used the silver foxes to probe the unusual ability of dogs to understand human gestures.

If a person hides food and then points to the location with a steady gaze, dogs will instantly pick up on the cue, while animals like chimpanzees, with considerably larger brains, will not. Dr. Hare wanted to know if dogs’ powerful rapport with humans was a quality that the original domesticators of the dog had selected for, or whether it had just come along with the tameness, as implied by Belyaev’s hypothesis.

He found that the fox kits from Belyaev’s domesticated stock did just as well as puppies in picking up cues from people about hidden food, even though they had almost no previous experience with humans. The tame kits performed much better at this task than the wild kits did. When dogs were developed from wolves, selection against fear and aggression “may have been sufficient to produce the unusual ability of dogs to use human communicative gestures,” Dr. Hare wrote last year in the journal Current Biology.

Dr. Hare believes that wolves probably have the same cognitive powers as dogs, but their ability to solve social problems, like picking up human cues to hidden food, is masked by their fear. Dogs, after their fear is removed by domestication, see humans as potential social partners, not as predators, and are ready to interact with them. But though selection for tameness was probably the first step in domesticating dogs, Dr. Hare said, they may well have adapted to human societies in other ways, with the smarter dogs leaving more progeny.

Although most of the tame foxes have stayed in Novosibirsk, Svante Paabo, also of the Planck Institute, recently managed to persuade the Russian researchers to let him have some of both breeds of the rats, after visiting Novosibirsk several times.

“It looked as if it would not work for a long time, but in the end we managed to build enough trust,” Dr. Paabo said. He and his student, Mr. Albert, work closely with Dr. Plyusnina. Mr. Albert hopes to identify which of the rats’ genes were selected for by the domestication process.

His strategy is to cross the tame rats with the ferocious rats and then score the progeny for how much of each trait they inherit. He hopes to identify 200 sites along the genome at which the tame and ferocious rats differ. If one or more of the sites correlate with tameness or fierceness in the progeny, they will probably lie near important genes that underlie one of the two traits.

The genes, if Mr. Albert finds them, would be of great interest because they are presumably the same in all species of domesticated mammal. That may even include humans. Richard Wrangham, a primatologist at Harvard, has proposed that people are a domesticated form of ape, the domestication having been self-administered as human societies penalized or ostracized individuals who were too aggressive.

Dr. Paabo said that if Mr. Albert identified the genes responsible for domestication in rats, “we would also look at those genes in humans and apes to see if they might be involved in human evolution.”

Human self-domestication, if it occurred, would probably not have exactly the same genetic basis as tameness in animals. But Mr. Albert said that if he could pinpoint the genetic difference between the tame and ferocious rats, he would compare the chimp genome and the human genome to see if they showed a similar difference.

One possibility is that a handful of genes — perhaps even just one — underlie all the changes seen in domestication. A structure in the embryo of all vertebrates, known as the neural crest, is the source of cells that constitute much of the face, skull and pigment cells, and many parts of the peripheral nervous system and endocrine system. If the genes in the neural crest cells were delayed just a little in coming into action, a whole range of tissues could be affected, including the maturation of the adrenal glands that underlies the first fear response of young animals, Dr. Fitch has written.

Could a single gene that affects the timing of neural crest cell development underlie the whole phenomenon of animal and human domestication? “There would be one happy science Ph.D. student if that were true,” Mr. Albert said.


[+/-] show/hide this post

Scientists Say They’ve Found a Code Beyond Genetics in DNA - New York Times

Scientists Say They’ve Found a Code Beyond Genetics in DNA - New York Times

July 25, 2006

Researchers believe they have found a second code in DNA in addition to the genetic code.

The genetic code specifies all the proteins that a cell makes. The second code, superimposed on the first, sets the placement of the nucleosomes, miniature protein spools around which the DNA is looped. The spools both protect and control access to the DNA itself.

The discovery, if confirmed, could open new insights into the higher order control of the genes, like the critical but still mysterious process by which each type of human cell is allowed to activate the genes it needs but cannot access the genes used by other types of cell.

The new code is described in the current issue of Nature by Eran Segal of the Weizmann Institute in Israel and Jonathan Widom of Northwestern University in Illinois and their colleagues.

There are about 30 million nucleosomes in each human cell. So many are needed because the DNA strand wraps around each one only 1.65 times, in a twist containing 147 of its units, and the DNA molecule in a single chromosome can be up to 225 million units in length.

Biologists have suspected for years that some positions on the DNA, notably those where it bends most easily, might be more favorable for nucleosomes than others, but no overall pattern was apparent. Drs. Segal and Widom analyzed the sequence at some 200 sites in the yeast genome where nucleosomes are known to bind, and discovered that there is indeed a hidden pattern.

Knowing the pattern, they were able to predict the placement of about 50 percent of the nucleosomes in other organisms.

The pattern is a combination of sequences that makes it easier for the DNA to bend itself and wrap tightly around a nucleosome. But the pattern requires only some of the sequences to be present in each nucleosome binding site, so it is not obvious. The looseness of its requirements is presumably the reason it does not conflict with the genetic code, which also has a little bit of redundancy or wiggle room built into it.

Having the sequence of units in DNA determine the placement of nucleosomes would explain a puzzling feature of transcription factors, the proteins that activate genes. The transcription factors recognize short sequences of DNA, about six to eight units in length, which lie just in front of the gene to be transcribed.

But these short sequences occur so often in the DNA that the transcription factors, it seemed, must often bind to the wrong ones. Dr. Segal, a computational biologist, believes that the wrong sites are in fact inaccessible because they lie in the part of the DNA wrapped around a nucleosome. The transcription factors can only see sites in the naked DNA that lies between two nucleosomes.

The nucleosomes frequently move around, letting the DNA float free when a gene has to be transcribed. Given this constant flux, Dr. Segal said he was surprised they could predict as many as half of the preferred nucleosome positions. But having broken the code, “We think that for the first time we have a real quantitative handle” on exploring how the nucleosomes and other proteins interact to control the DNA, he said.

The other 50 percent of the positions may be determined by competition between the nucleosomes and other proteins, Dr. Segal suggested.

Several experts said the new result was plausible because it generalized the longstanding idea that DNA is more bendable at certain sequences, which should therefore favor nucleosome positioning.

“I think it’s really interesting,” said Bradley Bernstein, a biologist at Massachusetts General Hospital.

Jerry Workman of the Stowers Institute in Kansas City said the detection of the nucleosome code was “a profound insight if true,” because it would explain many aspects of how the DNA is controlled.

The nucleosome is made up of proteins known as histones, which are among the most highly conserved in evolution, meaning that they change very little from one species to another. A histone of peas and cows differs in just 2 of its 102 amino acid units. The conservation is usually attributed to the precise fit required between the histones and the DNA wound around them. But another reason, Dr. Segal suggested, could be that any change would interfere with the nucleosomes’ ability to find their assigned positions on the DNA.

In the genetic code, sets of three DNA units specify various kinds of amino acid, the units of proteins. A curious feature of the code is that it is redundant, meaning that a given amino acid can be defined by any of several different triplets. Biologists have long speculated that the redundancy may have been designed so as to coexist with some other kind of code, and this, Dr. Segal said, could be the nucleosome code.


[+/-] show/hide this post

Celebrating Puzzles, in 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 Moves (or So) - New York Times

Celebrating Puzzles, in 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 Moves (or So) - New York Times

July 25, 2006

Christianity sanctifies Sunday as a day of rest and worship. In the early 19th century, some Protestant communities interpreted the Sabbath sobriety as an injunction against dancing, games and other entertainments. But in Massachusetts a loophole was found.

Nowhere in the Bible could the church leaders of Salem find a prohibition against puzzles, and in the absence of a “no,” they filled the gap with a resounding “yes.”

At the time, Salem was a center of brisk trade with China, and ship captains would often deliver a wooden chest filled with ivory puzzles as a gift for merchants, what came to be known as “Sunday boxes.” A particularly fine example of a Sunday box is one of the centerpieces of a major new exhibition of mechanical puzzles to open next week at the Lilly Library at Indiana University.

The exhibition, which contains many world-class specimens of mathematical and physics-based puzzles, is the first taste of a collection of more than 30,000 puzzles being donated to the library by Jerry Slocum, a retired engineer and a former vice president of Hughes Aircraft, who has been collecting puzzles and researching their history for more than half a century.

Mr. Slocum is the author of 10 books on the history of puzzles, including a recently published account of the sudoku-like 15 Puzzle, which precipitated a puzzle mania across America in the 1880’s.

Sitting in his private puzzle museum at his home in Beverly Hills, Calif., Mr. Slocum spoke about the exhibition and the convoluted, puzzlelike stories behind some of the pieces. Around him on shelves stacked from floor to ceiling sat thousands of puzzles of almost every conceivable shape and form: wooden, metal, wire, porcelain, plastic, glass and cardboard. There were Russian puzzle rattles, ancient Chinese puzzle mirrors and a rare example of an American Indian puzzle purse used to carry a version of gaming chips.

Of all the puzzles in the Sunday boxes, Mr. Slocum said, one of the most challenging was a deceptively simple-looking toy called Chinese rings. Its solution requires what mathematicians call a recursive sequence of moves.

The Chinese rings example in the library exhibition is particularly finely made. A set of rings are threaded over a long, thin loop with wires attached to each ring, tethering it below. Each ring can be taken off the loop or put back on only if the one next to it is on but the others farther down the chain are off. The goal is to get all the rings off.

According to legend, the puzzle was invented in the second century by a Chinese general who gave it to his wife to keep her busy while he was away at war. Logically, Mr. Slocum said, the puzzle is closely related to the Towers of Hanoi problem, which requires one to move a tower of increasingly smaller blocks from one peg to another.

In recursive puzzles like these, as the number of rings (or blocks) increases, the number of moves required to solve the puzzle increases exponentially. Recursive problems are well known to computer scientists, but it is harder for most of us to get a grip on this elusive concept.

Chinese rings make the problem tangible, Mr. Slocum noted, and reveal in a hands-on fashion the exponential growth entailed. There are typically nine rings in a classic set of Chinese rings; if a player makes no mistakes, the puzzle requires 341 moves to solve. Mr. Slocum can solve it in three to four minutes.

But on a table next to the Sunday box sat a version with 65 rings. A perfect solution in that case would take 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 moves, Mr. Slocum said. “Assuming one move every second, that would be 56 billion years, or four times the age of the universe,” he said.

This enigmatic object called to mind the White Queen’s advice to Alice about how the more one practices, the better one gets at believing in impossible things. Though solvable in principle, in practice this puzzle can never be completed. Mr. Slocum’s collection is a mind-boggling compendium of seemingly impossible, wildly improbable and sometimes breathtakingly difficult puzzles.

Breon Mitchell, director of the Lilly Library, said in an interview that the library was attracted to the collection “because we believe puzzles are important in the history of thought, in the history of mathematics and philosophy, and also the history of science.”

Scott Kim, who writes a puzzle column for Discover magazine, said this was the first time a major collection of puzzles would be available in an academic setting.

“Puzzles have always interested scientists and engineers,” Mr. Kim said. “Many popular things, such as comic books, eventually become subjects for scholarly and academic study. Puzzles are on that cusp right now.”

Among the star pieces in the Lilly Library show is an original Rubik’s Cube signed by the Hungarian mathematician Erno Rubik, and a prototype of the first Rubik’s Cube with six rows of six blocks on each side. That is an object long believed impossible to make, Mr. Slocum said. Finally, last year, the Greek inventor Panayotis Verdes managed to build one.

The Rubik’s Cube is an example of a sequential movement puzzle, one of 10 basic categories in what Mr. Slocum called his “puzzle taxonomy.” Other categories include disentanglement puzzles (Chinese rings), interlocking solid puzzles (three-dimensional jigsaws) and take-apart puzzles, which include among their subcategories trick locks, trick knives and secret-compartment puzzles.

A beautiful example of the compartment puzzle is another standout of the Lilly Library show. Made by the Japanese puzzle master Akio Kamei, it appears to be a simple, albeit finely crafted wooden cube. But on the top is a hint of how to gain access to its secret compartment. Inlaid in the dark wood is a series of tiny circles of paler wood. The pattern matches the arrangement of stars in the constellation Cassiopeia, and the box will open only when the constellation is correctly aligned. A mechanism inside the box includes a compass that triggers a hidden lock.

Mr. Kamei has made a specialty of such science-based puzzles, and the library exhibition includes several striking examples.

Perhaps the most famous class of physics-based puzzles is one of the most ancient: puzzle vessels. Usually built in the form of a cup or a jug, these vessels offer the challenge that one must drink from them, or fill them up, without spilling any liquid. They have strategically placed holes, so it is immediately clear that a trick is entailed. Early precursors to the form date to at least the 10th century B.C., and Mr. Slocum’s collection includes examples from China, Peru, Germany, France and the Middle East.

Not all puzzles are complex. Mr. Slocum said that many of his favorites were the simplest, and that just because a puzzle was simple to look at did not mean it was easy to solve. He particularly likes one that consists of just two three-dimensional pieces that have to be arranged to form a tetrahedron. Another consists of four flat pieces that have to be arranged in the shape of the letter T.

“Both require geometrical reasoning that is counterintuitive,” he said. “Good puzzles always go against the grain of our thinking.”

Visitors to the Lilly Library will be able to play with a range of puzzles and view animations of various geometric puzzles. This involvement is a critical feature of the exhibition, said Dr. Mitchell, the library director.

“Generally,” he said, “you can only study puzzles from books, but when you have three-dimensional puzzles, it’s hard to get a sense of them from books alone.”

In keeping with the spirit of the show, the drawers and cupboards that hold the puzzles will themselves be puzzles.

“The first person who tries to open one each day will have to solve it,” Mr. Slocum said, his eyebrows arching slyly. “With puzzles, there is really no substitute for trying them out yourself.”


[+/-] show/hide this post

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

The Cold Sore's Clever Camouflage -- Krieger 2006 (531): 1 -- ScienceNOW

The Cold Sore's Clever Camouflage -- Krieger 2006 (531): 1 -- ScienceNOW

The Cold Sore's Clever Camouflage

By Gretchen Vogel
ScienceNOW Daily News
31 May 2006

The classic trick of herpes viruses is their ability to lay dormant in the body, undetected by the immune system, just waiting for the perfect opportunity to cause a new outbreak of cold sores, shingles, or mononucleosis. Now researchers have puzzled out the molecular ruse that allows the most common of these viruses--herpes simplex virus-1 or HSV-1--to remain undetected for years.

After an initial infection, HSV-1 goes into hiding in nerve cells, where it eludes the immune system's sentries. It shuts down all of its genes except one--a gene called the LATency-associated transcript (LAT). Scientists identified LAT more than a decade ago, and a few years later researchers showed that it works to prevent infected cells from dying by blocking apoptosis, the cell's program of ritual suicide. "Since then people have been looking for the protein [the gene makes], but have had no luck," says microbiologist Nigel Fraser at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine.

That's because researchers were looking for the wrong kind of molecule. The LAT gene codes not for a protein but for a short stretch of RNA, Fraser and his colleagues report online this week in Nature. This so-called microRNA disrupts the expression of two key cellular genes called TGF-β and SMAD3, in a process known as RNA interference (RNAi). Both genes help to regulate apoptosis, and limiting their expression helps to keep the infected cell alive. Moreover, the immune system homes in on foreign proteins, so by using RNA instead of a protein to keep the host cell going, the virus manages to evade detection.

Some virus experts had started to suspect that latent herpes viruses might use RNAi--a molecular trick that scientists first recognized a few years ago. But this work is the first direct evidence that it is true, says Judy Lieberman, an RNAi expert at Harvard Medical School. She says the find suggests a way to attack the virus even in hiding. Scientists have successfully targeted other virus-infected cells with RNAi she says, and there may be a way to thwart the interference of the LAT gene.


[+/-] show/hide this post

Tuesday, July 18, 2006

Maybe We Should Leave That Up to the Computer - New York Times

Maybe We Should Leave That Up to the Computer - New York Times

July 18, 2006

Maybe We Should Leave That Up to the Computer

AMSTERDAM — Do you think your high-paid managers really know best? A Dutch sociology professor has doubts.

The professor, Chris Snijders of the Eindhoven University of Technology, has been studying the routine decisions that managers make, and is convinced that computer models, by and large, can do a better job of it. He even issued a challenge late last year to any company willing to pit its humans against his algorithms.

“As long as you have some history and some quantifiable data from past experiences,” Mr. Snijders claims, a simple formula will soon outperform a professional’s decision-making skills. “It’s not just pie in the sky,” he said. “I have the data to support this.”

Some of Mr. Snijders’s experiments from the last two years have looked at the results that purchasing managers at more than 300 organizations got when they placed orders for computer equipment and software. Computer models given the same tasks achieved better results in categories like timeliness of delivery, adherence to the budget and accuracy of specifications.

No company has directly taken Mr. Snijders up on his challenge. But a Dutch insurer, Interpolis, whose legal aid department has been expanding rapidly in recent years, called in Mr. Snijders to evaluate a computer model it had designed to automate the routing of new cases — a job previously handled manually by the department’s in-house legal staff.

The manager in charge of the project, Ludo Smulders, said the model was much faster and more accurate than the old system. “We’re very satisfied about the results it’s given our organization,” he said. “That doesn’t mean there are no daily problems, but the problems are much smaller than when the humans did it by hand. And it lets them concentrate more on giving legal advice, which is what their job is.”

Mr. Snijders’s work builds on something researchers have known for decades: that mathematical models generally make more accurate predictions than humans do. Studies have shown that models can better predict, for example, the success or failure of a business start-up, the likelihood of recidivism and parole violation, and future performance in graduate school.

They also trump humans at making various medical diagnoses, picking the winning dogs at the racetrack and competing in online auctions. Computer-based decision-making has also grown increasingly popular in credit scoring, the insurance industry and some corners of Wall Street.

The main reason for computers’ edge is their consistency — or rather humans’ inconsistency — in applying their knowledge.

“People have a misplaced faith in the power of judgment and expertise,” said Greg Forsythe, a senior vice president at Schwab Equity Ratings, which uses computer models to evaluate stocks.

The algorithms behind so-called quant funds, he said, act with “much greater depth of data than the human mind can. They can encapsulate experience that managers may not have.” And critically, models don’t get emotional. “Unemotional is very important in the financial world,” he said. “When money is involved, people get emotional.” Many putative managerial qualities, like experience and intuition, may in fact be largely illusory. In Mr. Snijders’s experiments, for example, not only do the machines generally do better than the managers, but some managers perform worse over time, as they develop bad habits that go uncorrected from lack of feedback.

Other cherished decision aids, like meeting in person and poring over dossiers, are of equally dubious value when it comes to making more accurate choices, some studies have found, with face-to-face interviews actually degrading the quality of an eventual decision.

“People’s overconfidence in their ability to read someone in a half-an-hour interview is quite astounding,” said Michael A. Bishop, an associate professor of philosophy at Northern Illinois University who studies the social implications of these models.

And the effects can be serious. “Models will do much better in predicting violence than will parole officers, and in that case, not using them leads to a more dangerous society,” he said. “But people really don’t believe that the models are as accurate as they are.”

Models have other advantages beyond their accuracy and consistency. They allow an organization to codify and centralize its hard-won knowledge in a concrete and easily transferable form, so it stays put when the experts move on. Models also can teach newcomers, in part by explaining the individual steps that lead to a given choice. They are also faster than people, are immune to fatigue and give the human experts more time to work on other tasks beyond the current scope of machines.

So if they’re so good, why aren’t they already used everywhere?

Not everyone is convinced that managers are incorrigibly myopic. “I’ve never seen any evidence that there is a pattern of decline at all, and it just doesn’t fit with the way management literature is going, which is all around the emotional intelligence angle,” said Laura Empson, the director of the Clifford Chance Center of the Said Business School at Oxford University.

“I think there are a lot of people who have a strong technological orientation who would agree life would be a lot simpler if it weren’t for the humans,” she said. “But the reality is, organizations do have a lot of very intense and complicated human issues within them.”

Max H. Bazerman, a professor at Harvard Business School, wonders how many managerial decisions can actually be modeled. “The vast majority of decisions that we make in professional life don’t have this quality,” he said.

He agrees that models can make better decisions about credit card applications and college admissions, he said, “but there are many decisions that are much more unique, where that database doesn’t exist. I’m as skeptical about human intuition as these folks, but it’s not only a computer model that we replace it with. Sometimes it’s thinking more clearly.”

Many in the field of computer-assisted decision-making still refer to the debacle of Long Term Capital Management, a highflying hedge fund that counted several Nobel laureates among its founders. Its algorithms initially mastered the obscure worlds of arbitrage and derivatives with remarkable skill, until the devaluation of the Russian ruble in 1998 sent the fund into a tailspin.

“As long as the underlying conditions were in order, the computer model was almost like a money machine,” said Roger A. Pielke Jr., a professor of environmental studies at the University of Colorado whose work focuses on the relation between science and decision-making. “But when the assumptions that went into the creation of those models were violated, it led to a huge loss of money, and the potential collapse of the global financial system.”

In such situations, “you can never hope to capture all of the contingencies or variables inside of a computer model,” he said. “Humans can make big mistakes also, but humans, unlike computer models, have the ability to recognize when something isn’t quite right.”

Another problem with the models is the issue of accountability. Mr. Forsythe of Schwab pointed out that “there’s no such thing as a 100 percent quantitative fund,” in part because someone has to be in charge if the unexpected happens. “If I’m making decisions,” he said, “I don’t want to give up control and say, ‘Sorry, the model told me.’ The client wants to know that somebody is behind the wheel.”

Still, some consider the continuing ascendance of models as inevitable, and recommend that people start figuring out the best way to adapt to the role reversal. Mark E. Nissen, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., who has been studying computer-vs.-human procurement, sees a fundamental shift under way, with humans becoming increasingly peripheral in making routine decisions, concentrating instead on designing ever-better models.

“The newest space, and the one that’s most exciting, is where machines are actually in charge, but they have enough awareness to seek out people to help them when they get stuck,” he said — for example, when making “particularly complex, novel, or risky” decisions.

The ideal future, then, may lie in letting computers and people each do what they do best. One way to facilitate this development is to train people to identify the typical cognitive foibles that lead to bad choices. “I’ve now worked with these models for so long,” Mr. Snijders said, “that my instincts have changed along the way.”

As Mr. Bishop of Northern Illinois University puts it, by making smart use of computer models’ advantages, “you’ll become like the crafty A student who doesn’t work that hard but gets mostly right answers, rather than the really hard-working student who gets lots of wrong answers and as a result gets C’s.”


[+/-] show/hide this post

Wednesday, July 05, 2006

Project Syndicate

Project Syndicate

Will China’s Capitalist Revolution Turn Democratic

Minxin Pei

Communist China has experienced a monumental capitalist revolution in the last two decades, with an economy that is now six times bigger than it was 20 years ago. A minor player in the global economy in the 1980’s, China today is the world’s third largest trading power. But if these stunning economic statistics make you think that so much capitalist development must also have brought more democracy to China, think again.

Most Westerners believe in a theory of liberal evolution, according to which sustained economic growth, by increasing wealth and the size of the middle class, gradually makes a country more democratic. While the long-run record of this theory is irrefutable, China’s authoritarian ruling elite is not only determined to hold on to power, but it also has been smart enough to take adaptive measures aimed at countering the liberalizing effects of economic development.

Thus, for all its awe-inspiring economic achievement, China has made remarkably little progress in political liberalization. Indeed, judging by several key indicators, progress toward democracy in China has stalled, despite unprecedented economic prosperity and personal freedom.

For instance, in the mid-1980’s, Chinese leaders seriously discussed and later drew up a blueprint for modest democratic reforms. Today, the topic of political reform is taboo. Nearly all the major institutional reforms, such as strengthening the legislature, holding village elections, and building a modern legal system, were launched in the 1980’s. Since the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989, however, not a single major democratic reform initiative has been implemented.

Instead of democratic transition, China has witnessed a consolidation of authoritarian rule – the strengthening of a one-party regime through organizational learning and adaptation. Since 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pursuing a two-pronged strategy: selective repression that targets organized political opposition and co-optation of new social elites (the intelligentsia, professionals, and private entrepreneurs).

This strategy emphasizes the maintenance of an extensive law enforcement apparatus designed to eliminate any incipient organized opposition. Huge investments have strengthened the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a large anti-riot paramilitary force whose specialty is the quick suppression of anti-government protests by disgruntled industrial workers, peasants, and urban residents. Frequent deployment of the PAP is a major reason why the tens of thousands of collective protests that occur each year (74,000 in 2004 and 86,000 in 2005) have had a negligible impact on China’s overall stability.

To deal with new emerging political threats, such as the information revolution, the Chinese government has spent mightily on manpower and technology. A special 30,000-strong police unit monitors and screens Internet traffic, advanced technology is deployed to block access to overseas Web sites considered “hostile or harmful,” and Internet service and content providers, both domestic and Western, must comply with onerous restrictions designed to suppress political dissent and track down offenders. The regime has even conducted multi-agency exercises to test whether different government bodies could cooperate closely to keep “harmful information” off the Net during an emergency.

Having learned from the collapse of the Soviet Union that a bureaucratic ruling party must co-opt new social elites to deprive potential opposition groups of leaders, the Communist Party has conducted an effective campaign of expanding its social base. The urban intelligentsia and professionals have been pampered with material perks and political recognition, while new private entrepreneurs have been allowed to join the Party.

This strategy of pre-emptive political decapitation has produced enormous dividends for the Party. In the 1980’s, its principal adversaries were the urban intelligentsia, who constituted the backbone of the pro-democracy movement that culminated in Tiananmen Square. Today, the mainstream of the Chinese intelligentsia is an integral part of the ruling elite. Many have joined the Party and become government officials, and a large percentage enjoy various professional and financial privileges.

Predictably, the intelligentsia, usually the most liberal social group, is no longer a lethal threat to party rule. Worse, without support from this strategic group, other social groups, such as workers and peasants, have become politically marginalized and rudderless.

Although the Party’s carrot-and-stick approach has worked since 1989, it is doubtful that it will retain its efficacy for another 17 years. To the extent that China’s authoritarian regime is by nature exclusionary (it can only incorporate a limited number of elites), the co-optation strategy will soon run up against its limits, and the Party will no longer have the resources to buy off the intelligentsia or keep private entrepreneurs happy.

At the same time, selective repression can contain social frustrations and discontent only temporarily. As long as much of Chinese society views the current political system as unjust, unresponsive, and corrupt, there will always be a large reservoir of ill will toward the ruling elites.

When things go wrong – as is likely, given mounting social strains caused by rising inequality, environmental degradation, and deteriorating public services – China’s alienated masses could become politically radicalized. And, unlike past protests, which have usually been allied with students or members of the intelligentsia, popular disaffection might not have the virtue of rational leaders with whom the government could talk and negotiate.

So it may be premature for the Party to celebrate the success of its adaptive strategy. China’s rulers may have stalled democratic trends for now, but the current strategy has, perhaps, merely delayed the inevitable.

Minxin Pei is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of China’s Trapped Transition.


[+/-] show/hide this post

Monday, July 03, 2006

Capitalist Roaders - New York Times

Capitalist Roaders - New York Times

July 2, 2006

Capitalist Roaders

Zhu Jihong cannot wait to get started on his holiday road trip. At 6 a.m. on Saturday, the first day of the October National Day week (one of three annual Golden Weeks in China, intended to promote internal tourism and ensure that workers take some time off), Zhu has parked his brand-new Hyundai Tucson S.U.V., with its limited-edition package of extras like walnut trim and chrome step-bar, in front of my hotel in downtown Beijing. He is half an hour early, but he is in a hurry. He cannot believe I'm not ready.

Li Lu, a friend who is coming along as my interpreter, has found me in the hotel restaurant. She was rousted even earlier than I, at her apartment a couple of miles away, and calculates that Zhu, to make it into Beijing from his home on the city's outskirts, must have gotten up at 4. She adds that she's a bit concerned: she helped me book a spot on this car trip and had assumed that the driver whose car we shared would be a person of, well, culture. But Zhu, she says, is "not educated."

"What do you mean?" I ask as we leave the hotel's revolving glass doors and come upon Zhu.

Zhu is nicely dressed, in the dark slacks, leather loafers and knit shirt of many Chinese businessmen. Cigarette in one hand, hair recently cut and wavy on top, Zhu, in his 40's, has a somewhat dashing, youthful air. Before Li Lu and I are out the revolving door, he is at the back of the Hyundai, making room for my knapsack and pointing me in the direction of the leather passenger seat. He stops to shake my hand only after I pause and offer mine. Li Lu is our intermediary and tries to effect the introduction I'm after, but Zhu is not one for formalities; he gives a tiny nod, then circles the car, hawks noisily and spits by his door, climbs in and turns the key. Li Lu, from the back seat, gives me a look that says: See? What did I tell you?

But as the car fills with smoke from his cigarette and the CB radio battles for supremacy with operatic Red Army tunes on the CD player, I don't much mind Zhu's manners (which, Li Lu explains, reflect the factory owner's peasant background) because we're off on an adventure and Zhu's excitement is infectious. Our trip is a seven-day excursion from Beijing to Hubei Province in Central China, including stops at the Three Gorges Dam and a mountainous forest preserve called Shennongjia, fabled home to a race of giant hairy ape-men. And though the trendy enterprise we are part of is known as a "self-driving tour," we are not going alone: a dozen carfuls of other people have signed on with the tour, organized by the Beijing Target Auto Club, one of the for-profit driving clubs that are sprouting all over China.

Zhu is ready for a long day at the wheel — our destination, Nanyang, is more than 500 miles away — but it's going to be even longer than he thinks. Our rendezvous with the other cars at the Zhuozhou rest stop, normally an hour away, will be delayed four hours, as thick fog closes the expressway. Heavy rain will fall, and our early start will count for little by midday as the highways swell with holiday traffic. There will be wrecks, like the fatal one-car rollover we'll pass on a bridge around midnight, an upside-down Beijing-plated Mitsubishi. The hotel's dinner will be waiting for us at 1 a.m., and we'll all be happy to see our rooms. But right now Zhu is pouring himself tea from a thermos and telling Li Lu how rich he is and how lucky we are to be in his car.

"He says he is an excellent driver and we will go very fast," she reports wearily.


The figures behind China's car boom are stunning. Total miles of highway in the country: at least 23,000, more than double what existed in 2001, and second now only to the United States. Number of passenger cars on the road: about 6 million in 2000 and about 20 million today. Car sales are up 54 percent in the first three months of 2006, compared with the same period a year ago; every day, 1,000 new cars (and 500 used ones) are sold in Beijing. The astronomic growth of China's car-manufacturing industry will soon hit home for Americans and Europeans as dirt-cheap Chinese automobiles start showing up for sale here over the next two or three years. (Think basic passenger car for $10,000, luxury S.U.V. for $19,000.)

But of course the story is not only about construction and production; car culture is taking root in China, and in many ways it looks like ours. City drivers, stuck in ever-growing jams, listen to traffic radio. They buy auto magazines with titles like The King of Cars, AutoStyle, China Auto Pictorial, Friends of Cars, Whaam ("The Car — The Street — The Travel — The Racing"). Two dozen titles now compete for space in kiosks. The McDonald's Corporation said last month that it expects half of its new outlets in China to be drive-throughs. Whole zones of major cities, like the Asian Games Village area in Beijing, have been given over to car lots and showrooms.

In other ways, though, the Chinese are still figuring cars out and doing things their way. Take the phrase used to describe our expedition: "self-driving trip." It is called self-driving to contrast it with the more customary idea of driving in China: that someone else drives you. Until recently, everyone important enough to own a car was also important enough to have his or her own driver. Traditions grew up around this, like the chauffeur joining his boss at the table for meals while on duty — something still commonly seen.

But those practices are growing fusty. What are new and explosively popular are car clubs — some organized around the idea of travel, like the Beijing Target Auto Club, and others organized around the idea of. . .well, simply fun. The Beijing VW Polo Club, for example, has an active Web site and hundreds of youthful members. (The Polo is a VW model popular in Europe and Latin America and now manufactured in China as well.) Club members meet regularly to learn about maintenance, deliver toys to orphans and take weekend pleasure drives reminiscent of America in the 30's and 40's. To celebrate the 2008 Beijing Olympics, four-dozen members recently turned up in a giant parking lot to form the Olympic logo with their compact, candy-colored cars, each circle a different hue. Single members have found mates in the club, and at least one of their weddings featured an all-Polo procession through the streets of Beijing.

In the West, cars can still excite, but the family car soon becomes part of the furniture. In China, however, it's nothing of the sort. Li Anding, author of two books on the car in China and the country's leading automotive journalist, told me why when he invited me to join some of his industry pals for dinner in Beijing. "The desire for cars here is as strong as in America, but here the desire was repressed for half a century," he began. All private cars were confiscated shortly after the Communists came into power in 1949, supposedly because they were symbols of the capitalist lifestyle. Having a car became the exclusive privilege of party officials.

Across the table, Li Anding's colleague Li Tiezheng explained that "people my age loved Russian movies. They gave us the idea we should all own a car, and we all wondered why we couldn't." Li Tiezheng bought his first car — a Polish-made Fiat — when private ownership was finally permitted in the mid-1990's. But the stigma against ownership was still huge. "The pressure was so great, I couldn't tell anyone. I lied that I had borrowed it."

That didn't last long. By 2000, enough regulations had been removed, and enough people were making money, that car ownership became a reality for many Chinese for the first time. Li Anding, born in 1949, the year the Communists came to power, said he was still astonished at the change: "When I started writing about cars, I never expected to see private cars in China in my generation, much less some of the world's fanciest cars, being driven every day."

As the men around the table listened to Li's history and added to it, there was a palpable sense of pride. This wasn't simply progress on the level of a convenience — analogous, say, to your neighborhood moving from dial-up to high-speed Internet. To them it was China finally entering the world stage and participating fully in human progress. It had the additional meaning of something long denied that could finally be acquired, like a wrong being rectified. Over and over again, the group described car ownership with a term I would never have thought to use:

"Once China opened up and Chinese people could see the other side of the world and know how people lived there, you could no longer limit the right to buy cars."

"This right is something that has been ours all along."

"Driving is our right."


When Li Lu noticed the sign for the Zhuozhou Service Area of the Jingshi Expressway, Zhu Jihong was on one of his favorite subjects: destinations. He had done self-driving to Mongolia and Manchuria, he said, to Xinjiang and to Xi'an and the Silk Road. He made a round trip to Tibet — fantastic! — and was considering one to Hong Kong. The main problem with our current itinerary, in his opinion, was that it was too short: "A week isn't long enough to really feel like you've been away." His wife was less and less interested in these odysseys, preferring, lately, to stay home and mind the hotel and restaurant he had bought near his hometown outside Beijing. And his son, oddly enough, wasn't interested in driving at all.

Li Lu interrupted Zhu and made sure he noticed — this was where we were to pull off and finally meet the group. Though it was early afternoon now and Zhu had been driving for hours, he barely looked tired. I thought to peek at the odometer of his two-month-old Hyundai as he slowed; it showed 7,700 kilometers, or nearly 4,800 miles. That was an annual rate of nearly 30,000 miles, and most of them would be pleasure driving.

Though the parking lot was the first time most members of the trip had seen one another, they had been talking for hours: each driver, before today, had stopped by the Beijing Target Auto Club office to pick up a CB radio and rooftop antenna. The rendezvous was on one side of the lot, and in the middle of the group was a vehicle with the biggest antenna of all, a thickly bumpered, sticker-plastered, red-flagged Chinese-made four-by-four belonging to the president of the Target club, Zhao Xiangjie.

Zhao and his truck were decked out for safari: he was wearing a khaki utility vest with many zippers, busily meeting members of the group as they arrived. Across the lot, a self-driving group from Guangzhou was similarly mustered, easy to spot by the big stickers with numbers on everyone's side doors and rear windows. And this, it turned out, was Zhao's next duty, to adorn each vehicle with its numbers. My driver, Zhu, accepted his with great ceremony, cleaning his doors first to ensure good adhesion, making sure the number decals were straight and even. If one theme here was safari, another was road rally, the decals suggesting that everyone was part of a speedy team.

Though most are organized around the idea of trips, Chinese car clubs come in many flavors. Some are run by dealers (like a Honda dealership in Guangzhou), and others (like the VW Polo Club in Beijing) are nonprofit and organized around a particular model. At least one is the offshoot of an outdoor-recreational-gear manufacturer. Many are just for four-wheel-drive vehicles and aim to go to the back of beyond. Travel agencies sponsor some; others are run for and by motorcyclists.

One of Zhao Xiangjie's advantages, at the Beijing Target Auto Club, is good connections in officialdom. He has worked as a composer, filmmaker and official celebration organizer; he knows important people and has succeeded in getting them to steer big commissions his way. His auto-club offices are in the government-run Olympics Center. In a speech he gave to the 2005 Auto Clubs and Fans C.E.O. Forum, I heard him assert that more government involvement was needed if automobile-related industries like the clubs were to develop in an optimal fashion. I sensed that he wouldn't mind being China's first under secretary of car clubs.

But an alternate strategy may have more momentum. Back in Beijing, a young man named Chen Ming helps run what appears to be the largest self-driving organization in China: the auto-club arm of Beijing traffic radio FM 103.9. His employees, around 100 of them, occupy a floor and a half of a midsize office building. Chen Ming has high volume and a rapidly growing business. Linking an auto club to traffic radio seems inspired. Members pay $27 a year and receive benefits that include group insurance rates, gasoline rebates, "auto rescue" within Beijing's Fifth Ring Road, free rental cars if a repair takes more than three days, et cetera. Chen got his start in the business as Zhao's protégé — he was assistant manager of the Beijing Target Auto Club — and when I spoke with him in Beijing, he shared his belief that Zhao's approach, his eagerness to stay involved with the government, is outdated.

Maybe half of the vehicles in our group were S.U.V.'s and the rest were passenger cars, almost all with foreign labels — Toyota, Volkswagen, Mitsubishi, Citroën — not the cheaper Chinese models that made up the majority of cars on the road, the Fotons, Geelys, Cherys, JAC's. (More than 40 local brands are currently manufactured in China.) One of the foreign cars caught my eye: a flashy white Volvo S80, driven by a man who was also a distinctive dresser. With his white leather loafers, tight jeans, white belt with a big silver buckle and white shirt ("Verdace," read the logo), Fan Li, a television producer, cut an intriguing figure. He was accompanied on this trip by his pretty 24-year-old daughter, Fan Longyin, who was recently back from film school in France. Longyin was quickly becoming friends with Jia Lin, a single female reporter for The Beijing Youth Daily, who was in her 30's. Jia wore a tan leather jacket with a winged glossy-lip logo on the back that said "Flying Kiss." Like me, Jia came without a car, but it looked as if she would start riding with the Fans.

And then there was the attractive young family in the white Volkswagen Passat, the Chens: Xiaohong (who uses the name Peter with English speakers), the personable information-technology executive; his wife, Yin Aiqin, an electric power consultant; and their 4-year-old daughter, Yen Yi Yi, whom, I would soon learn, was already taking voice lessons at home from a member of the Beijing Opera.

More nerdy but genial were the bespectacled Wangs, in their Citroën Xsara: she ran part of the back office of Air China; he worked for an international freight firm. They, too, had an unattached passenger who shared the driving and expenses. He was the urbane Zhou Yan, a partner in China's third-largest law firm.

And then there were the businessmen. Organized by a cement-plant owner, Li Xingjie, these 10 or 11 guys from the same Beijing suburb, Fangshan, rode in S.U.V.'s and tended to stick to themselves. Some of them owned coal-processing plants, which meant they were rich.

Soon all 11 cars were bedecked with numbers and the club logo. Pit stops and snack purchases were completed; the service area looked a bit like one on an American toll road, though there was no landscaping, the simple restaurant was not a fast-food franchise and the convenience store was not as elaborately stocked as in the States. The gas station — state-run Sinopec — filled Zhu's Hyundai for about $1.85 a gallon, and I paid in cash, gas and tolls being my contribution to expenses. (Sinopec stations only recently began accepting credit cards.) Everyone piled back in their cars, and we hit the road. We would reconvene for dinner.


China's first modern expressway, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen Superhighway, was built in the early 1990's by the Hong Kong tycoon Gordon Y.S. Wu. Wu studied civil engineering at Princeton in the mid-50's, when construction was beginning on the U.S. Interstate Highway System. At the same time, the New Jersey Turnpike was being widened from four lanes to many lanes, and Wu has said it inspired him. (His powerful firm, Hopewell Holdings, is named after a town near Princeton.) Though Wu ran short of money and the ambitious project had to be rescued by the Chinese government, the toll-road model of highway development caught on.

Wu's Guangzhou-Shenzhen Superhighway was the beginning of an infrastructure binge that seems to be only picking up steam: the government recently announced a target of 53,000 freeway miles by 2035. (The U.S. Interstate Highway System, 50 years old last week, presently comprises about 46,000 miles of roads.) Some new roads, especially in the less-developed western parts of the nation, are nearly empty: China is encouraging road construction ahead of industrial development and population settlement, assuming those will follow.

The goal, of course, is not simply to replicate the boom of coastal areas, where the majority of the country's population now lives. China's larger aim is to consolidate the nation. Its version of Manifest Destiny — the "great development of the West" or "Go West" policy begun in January 2000 — envisions far-western territories, like Tibet and the fuel-rich province Xinjiang (the name translates as "New Frontier"), fully integrated, ethnically and economically, with the rest of the country. It seems quite likely that, similar to the case with American history, local indigenous cultures stand to lose along the way. What the United States gained (and lost) with the Pony Express, covered wagons and steam trains, China may achieve with roads and automobiles.

If highways in China's west are so far awaiting traffic, easterners have the opposite concern. As we headed south from Shijiazhuang toward Zhengzhou, the roads packed with vacationers and truck traffic, Zhu jostled for position with all the other people who were late getting where they were going. His style of driving helped me understand better why China, with 2.6 percent of the world's vehicles, had 21 percent of its road fatalities (in 2002, the most recent year for which figures are available).

Of course, there must be many reasons. The large number of new drivers is one; few of today's Chinese drivers grew up driving, and road-safety awareness seems low. Many roads are probably dangerous — though not, I would venture to say, the beautiful new expressway we were on. It was like an American Interstate, only sleeker: the guardrails were angular and attractive, not fat and ugly, and in the divider strip there was typically a well-pruned hedge, high enough to protect drivers from the glare of beams from opposing traffic at night. Beyond the guardrails, grassy embankments sloped down to buffer areas carefully planted with a single species of tree, often poplar. The road surface was perfectly smooth, transitions even, signage sparse but clear. Periodically we saw orange-suited workers hand-pruning the center hedge or sweeping the wide shoulder with old handmade brooms. There was never a maintenance truck nearby; wherever they came from, they apparently walked.

It was the sweepers I worried about. Officially, there were two lanes of travel in each direction. But each side also had a shoulder, and on this expressway, at least, the shoulder was exactly as wide as the travel lanes. Thus Zhu and others (despite signs asserting that it was forbidden) used the shoulder as the passing lane. Occasionally, of course, a sweeper would loom, or a disabled vehicle, and Zhu would slam on the brakes and veer into the truck lane. Once past the obstacle, he would floor it and swerve back out, brake once again, swerve, honk — it was almost like being in a video game, except that video games end or you can walk away. We, on the other hand, had a long way to go.

"Li Lu, does Mr. Zhu know that more Chinese die on the road every day than died here during the entire SARS epidemic?" I asked her. She translated. Zhu looked at me and laughed. "I think he didn't understand," she said. We consulted, and soon Li Lu announced from the back seat that we both really wished he would slow down a bit. Zhu looked at me sidelong and then, if anything, speeded up.

The next morning Zhu was tired, finally, and asked if I wanted to drive. I hesitated for a moment. I had researched the issue and was fairly certain that foreign tourists were forbidden to drive between cities in China. Most Chinese, however, seem never to have considered the possibility of foreigners behind the wheel, and from the beginning, Zhao asked whether I would be willing to help with the driving. Far be it from me to shirk this responsibility. So I said sure and climbed into the driver's seat.

This day's driving was different from the previous day's. As we moved farther from the coast and its expressways, we spent more time on national highways, which generally are two-lane and pass through a lot of towns. Everyone in the club stuck pretty close together, and there was a lot of chatting over the radio. Our leader, Zhao, began by apologizing for yesterday's overlong drive. Even if there hadn't been a highway closure due to fog, slowness due to rain and holiday congestion, it was too long a drive for the first day, and he was sorry. But he was also upbeat and sounded excited about getting to Three Gorges Dam that afternoon. He moderated the CB chat that followed, prompting each car's occupants to take turns introducing themselves. Some told a joke, some sang a song. Fan, in the white Volvo, put on an Elvis Presley CD and held his mike to the speaker, playing "Love Me Tender" in honor of me, Elvis's countryman. As we passed through one village an hour past breakfast, a clamor rose for a pit stop.

The men had little trouble finding places to relieve themselves near the edge of town, but women were in more of a bind. China's car culture — not to mention consumer culture — has not yet reached the countryside, and there was no restaurant nearby, no fast-food joint, no gas station/convenience store. Chen Yin Aiqin, her daughter at her side, knocked tentatively on the door of a farmhouse and was soon welcomed inside and ushered to the latrine out back. Afterward, before their car pulled away, she dashed back to the farmer's door with a small box of chocolate from Beijing.

The lack of infrastructure for touring drivers is one reason that these organized self-driving tours are so popular. Besides having planned in advance (through arrangements with local travel agents) where we would stop to eat and sleep every day, Zhao had an expert mechanic in his four-by-four: repair garages were few and far between, and one of the Beijingers' main fears was breaking down far from home, with nobody trustworthy nearby to help.

The national roads, while more interesting to drive than the expressways, were also more nerve-racking. There were considerable numbers of people on bicycles, on foot and on small tractors; there were crossroads; and least expected by me, there were many places where I had to swerve toward the middle of the road because of farmers having appropriated a strip of pavement along the edge for drying their grain, usually corn. Sometimes the grain was laid out on blue tarps; other times the drying zone was outlined by rocks or boards; more than once, traffic slowed because of it. I had heard of Chinese farmers sometimes laying their wheat across the road so that passing vehicles would thresh it for them. But there was something aggressive about this appropriation of the highway.

The suggestion of rural hostility toward traffic and the number of people using the road for walking put me in mind of the famous "BMW Case," which received a lot of media attention two years before. A rich woman in a BMW, probably traveling on a road like this, was bumped by a farmer transporting his onion cart to market. Enraged, she struck the farmer and then revved her car and drove into the crowd. The peasant's wife was killed, but despite widespread outrage, China's Lizzie Grubman received only a suspended sentence.

BMW's seemed to be a sort of class-divide lightning rod. Recently, the number of kidnappings for ransom has shot up in China — the government reported 3,863 abductions in 2004, higher than the 3,000 a year reported on average in Colombia, the previous world leader. "In one case," according to The China Daily, "police searching the apartment of kidnappers in Guangdong Province found a list of all BMW owners in the city that appeared to have come from state vehicle registration rolls."

I was hoping to needle Zhu a bit, and so I asked him, if he was so rich, why didn't he have a BMW?

"Bad value," he said, explaining that while many foreign carmakers had plants in China and produced high-quality cars at a reasonable price, BMW's were all imported, with huge taxes added on. And indeed, this is true: tariffs and taxes add about 50 percent to the price of imported cars, making them high-status items. If you want to be really ostentatious, you do what rich guys like coal-mine operators from Shaanxi Province increasingly do and come into the city to buy a Hummer — those cost upward of $200,000. But Zhu thought that was ridiculous. The Volkswagen Passat he kept at home for his wife to drive was made in China, he said, as were growing numbers of other excellent foreign-designed cars, all of them produced under joint ventures with Chinese companies (some state-owned or -controlled), an arrangement the government hoped would encourage the growth of a domestic car industry. "Like my Hyundai," Zhu said proudly, putting his cigarette in his mouth so he could pat the dashboard. "Made in Beijing."


Not long after lunch, we started seeing signs for the Three Gorges Dam and accessed the site through tunnels along an expensively built mountainside road. Security was tight, with numerous guard posts, cameras and warning signs, and I was happy to swap seats with Zhu as we pulled into a roadside waiting area — just before an official came by to collect every driver's license. A guide boarded our leader's car and, over the radio, began a running commentary. I asked Zhu, between her remarks, what he thought of my driving.

"He says you are a good driver, but he has some advice," Li Lu reported. "He says to improve, you must be more brave!"

Three Gorges Dam, one of the largest construction projects in history, seemed a fitting first attraction for our trip, evoking superlatives in this land of superlatives. It has cost an estimated $75 billion so far (including corruption and relocation costs); it will require more than a million people to be relocated; it would generate more hydroelectric power than any dam ever had; and it spans the Yangtze, the third-longest river in the world. The reservoir began filling up in 2003 and has six years left to go; it presents a huge military target.

Like so much in China, the scale is almost too large to fathom. The 30-odd people in our group parked and then boarded buses that took us up to a visitor center above the dam; we peeked at a model dam indoors and then, like scores of others, scrambled around the viewpoint, taking lots of pictures. Fan turned out to have a serious interest in photography: his daughter posed, posed and posed again as her father assumed an exaggerated wide stance with his heavy Nikon digital camera. Others focused on the astonishing dam, proudly making sure I got a good look, witnesses to a great change who were, themselves, harbingers of a change.


Zhu was back at the wheel the next day as we drove from the Three Gorges area to Hongping, a town deep in Hubei Province and the jumping-off point for visits to Shennongjia, the forest reserve where everyone hoped to see a yeti.

His Hyundai had a six-CD changer in the dash, and among the titles in it were "The Relax Music of Automobiles," which turned out to be instrumental versions of the love songs of Deng Lijun, the Taiwanese pop singer of the 1970's. What Zhu really loved, however, was the old-time music on "The Red Sun: A Collection of Military Songs, Volume II." He played the CD again and again. The soaring, triumphalist music evoked bygone days, and I expressed surprise that a modern business guy like him loved the old socialist music so much. Zhu responded that it was the music he grew up with. He had worked on a farm, he confirmed. His grandfather became rich, but the Communists took it all away.

"Don't you dislike Mao for that?" I asked. He looked at me full on when Li Lu translated the question and then, at 60 miles per hour, turned sideways in his seat to show me the pin on his left lapel. It was a dime-size brass relief bust of the Great Helmsman himself. Steering with his knees, he put his chin to his chest, unpinned it and handed it to me as a gift.

"Many people still admire Mao very much," Li Lu explained. "They know he made mistakes, but they also think he did much good. He got rid of the Kuomintang. He brought China together. He is still a very big hero, like a god to some."

Fan, the television producer, I had noticed, was also in the worshipful camp. He had the leader's portrait, in Lucite, affixed to the top of the dashboard of his Volvo so that he could not see anything through the windshield without Mao appearing in his peripheral vision. After I asked about that and complimented him on the DVD screens built into the back of the front seats (for rear-seat passengers), Fan invited me into the Volvo for the better part of a morning's drive. Longyin, his daughter, took a seat in the back, along with Jia Lin, the reporter, and offered some background on her father. "My parents both suffered a lot in the Cultural Revolution," she began. Fan interrupted impatiently.

"Oh!" Longyin said. "My father is saying: 'There is no such thing as a perfect person. Everybody makes mistakes. Mao saved many people, but to do it he had to sacrifice his son, his wife, his whole family — everything. Now he's gone, but I want to go back to that time, when people shared everything."'

But do you really want to share everything? I asked Fan. Wouldn't sharing equally mean that a privileged few wouldn't be able to own new Volvos?

"I think now is a necessary period," Fan said, as his daughter translated. "We have to advance."

"Capitalism is something we've been waiting to try for a long time," Longyin said, quickly adding: "Personally, I hate the whole Mao thing. I think it's weird. I don't miss the sound of those old days at all." She did miss France, however, and her French boyfriend. She said she hoped to play a part in the growth of the Chinese film industry, perhaps by becoming an actors' agent. And some time in the next two or three months, she hoped to get a driver's license.

I was pleased to get to Hongping. The mountain hamlet was shrouded in mist, and the air was cool. Steep hillsides covered with deciduous trees rose on either side, and a creek ran through town, reminiscent of Vermont. We arrived at our hotel early in the afternoon, a nice change. It was three stars, clean, basic, but without a restaurant, elevator or easy parking, and soon we were checking out. "Beijingers are very picky," Li Lu told me. They didn't like it, and so Zhao had to find another. The new place seemed only incrementally better to me, but others were satisfied by the change. At dinner, Zhao was back to apologizing profusely for his poor judgment. But the men, anyway, were more interested in getting soused, and the error was soon forgiven.

When everyone rolled out of the restaurant, vendors were on the sidewalk, and Fan made us — and them — laugh with his uncanny shrill imitation of an older woman who had been hawking a melon. Zhou and others had heard there was a "cultural promotion" — a show featuring local ethnic talent — on the edge of town and proposed we attend en masse. Zhu demurred, asserting that a strip club would be more fun, if only one could be found. We walked there without him, arriving early and securing a row of seats in the front.

Though Zhou, the lawyer, spoke little English, I very much enjoyed his company. He was witty and sophisticated and, after a drink, warm and outgoing; every time he opened his mouth, it seemed, he made Li Lu break into laughter.

Zhu, on the other hand, was a challenge. Along with being his passenger, I was his roommate, a difficult proposition. He smoked heavily, whether while sitting naked after a shower, braying into the phone at his wife or watching TV in bed, his head propped up by pillows. Often I knew he was awake in the morning by the click of his lighter and the smoke wafting over my bed. He snored raucously. He didn't believe in lifting the toilet seat. And always he fell asleep with the television on. This wasn't such a bad thing: usually I just reached over to the night table and clicked it off with the remote.

But that night in Hongping, there was a snag. When I came back from the cultural show, Zhu was lying in bed on top of his sheets, watching a famous black-and-white movie from 1956, "Railroad Guerrilla," about Chinese peasant fighters throwing off the yoke of their Japanese imperialist occupiers. The guerrillas were just entering the imperial administrator's quarters when I came out of the bathroom: an extended storm of hacking machetes ensued, the Japanese falling left and right. Zhu murmured appreciatively and soon drifted off. I watched Japanese get cut down until I couldn't believe any could be left alive on the planet and then, over Zhu's rising snores, looked for the remote. It was nowhere to be found. The television itself had no on-off button, and its plug was hidden behind a heavy dresser; I needed to find the remote itself. Finally I spotted it, poking out from underneath Zhu's butt. I turned him over and extracted it, put in my earplugs and went to sleep.


The next morning, Li Lu sympathized with my desire to switch roommates. Zhou the lawyer had said he would happily share with me. But she declared it was an impossibility: Zhu would lose face if I abandoned him. "And there is nothing worse for a man like him than losing face," she said.

The next morning we hiked through the misty, craggy hills of Shennongjia. The area, known as "the Roof of Central China," is a Unesco biosphere reserve of 272 square miles, with six peaks measuring up to 10,190 feet above sea level. It was equally famous, among our group, as the home of China's Bigfoot. This creature, in the local lore, lumbered through the mists with a big-bosomed mate; an artist's rendition of the hairy couple appeared in the corner of a park billboard. But though the trails were beautiful and mysterious and we could imagine an ape-man happy there, none were spotted.

The police were directing traffic at the park entrance, and as we left, one officer noticed me in Zhu's passenger seat and waved us over. Foreigners are not permitted to travel in the direction we were headed, he declared, pointing to a sign. Zhu pulled over and summoned Zhao on the radio. Our entire group stopped, and major discussion ensued, which resulted, some 20 minutes later, in the policeman consenting to my passage. Zhao could be very persuasive.

"What was that all about?" I asked Li Lu.

"There are army bases in the mountains ahead," she said. "It is thought there are missiles there, to protect the Three Gorges Dam. You can't see them from the road, but the army is afraid of spies."

"But times are changing, right?" I asked. She looked uncertain, and I wasn't sure the answer was yes.

We drove for more than an hour, stopping for lunch in another little mountain town, Muyu. Halfway through the meal, a policeman looked in the room where we were eating. Uh-oh, I thought. As we left, a different policeman spotted me and uttered something grave. Zhao was summoned again. Other policemen arrived. My passport was requested, a phone call was made. Word came down: I had to go back. The old China was still around.

Zhao took me aside reassuringly and pressed a roll of yuan bills into my hand. Li Lu and I were to take a taxi back to Hongping, he said, while he figured out an alternate plan. We would call his cellphone from there.

The solution, we gathered, looked arduous: take a taxi, train and taxi, meeting up with the group the next night, or take a single long and expensive taxi, meeting up with them the next afternoon, but missing the Wudang Mountains and their monasteries famous for martial arts. As we waited for a driver, a call came in from the group up ahead: the cops in Muyu went home at dusk, they had heard. After dark, we should be able to blow through without any trouble. We consulted with some locals, and they concurred. And so it was decided.

We zoomed through Muyu without a hitch and, around midnight, passed as well through a couple of halfhearted traffic-boom-across-the-road checkpoints staffed by soldiers. I entered my hotel room in Wudang around 2 a.m. Naked on his bed, Zhu was sawing loudly, the television was blaring and the lights were all on. It was good to be back.


The next day we took a cable car to a cloud-shrouded monastery atop the Wudang Mountains. A particular temple there is said to be a place where cash offerings can influence your destiny. After conferring a moment with the attending monk, Jia Lin, the reporter, made a largish donation: 100 yuan, over $12. Li Lu explained to me that Jia really wanted to find a husband and hoped to effect that result. Jia's search, in fact, was the reason she came on this trip, which she imagined to be the kind of exciting adventure where you might meet a man. So far, however, things weren't panning out.

So belief in prayer was alive in China. What was less clear to me, after my brush with the police in the mountains, was how many in the urban, affluent world of self-driving tourers still believed in government authority.

My test question was speeding. National highways were typically posted with limits of 50 miles per hour, and expressways up to 75 miles per hour, and the orientation brochure that each driver had received from the Beijing Target Auto Club insisted that we adhere to those limits. ("This is only self-driving, not car racing!" the brochure read. "Speeding is not necessary.") Yet all the drivers, including Zhao, paid the rules no attention whatsoever, often driving 100 m.p.h. or more. Police cars were seldom seen; when drivers spotted them, to my surprise, they paid no attention at all. The cops rarely used radar, it turned out, and they almost never tried to pull you over.

What did concern Zhu and the others, though, were the speed cameras mounted unobtrusively on poles in the median. If you went too fast past a camera, it snapped your picture, and the ticket arrived in the mail. Simple as that. Zhu knew the location of most of the cameras along his normal routes around Beijing, but whenever he headed afield, the bills really piled up — sometimes $70 or $80 a month.

His solution was friends in the police department. They had given him a special red license plate that was affixed beneath his regular one; he believed this stopped a lot of the tickets in their tracks. But Zhu — like many others on the trip — was also intrigued by a device in the Nissan S.U.V. of Li Xingjie, 42, the leader of the Fangshan businessmen's group. The short, bald man was widely envied among members of the tour for his radar detector, reputed to detect not only radar but also cameras. I joined him one afternoon, and he proudly demonstrated: the rumors were true, and the device also gave advance notice of tollbooths and service areas. Made in Taiwan, the detector cost Li $350 and, as it stated in English on its bottom, detected "all speed equipment on mainland!" He used to pay about $1,250 annually in fines, but no longer did.

"But isn't this kind of seditious?" I asked via Li Lu. "Isn't this Taiwan helping to undermine the laws of the mainland?"

On the contrary, Li said, "this detector helps me obey the law. You have to obey laws. We have to obey the government!"

I wasn't sure whether he was sincere. As we blew by an aging police cruiser at over 100 (the cruiser, by my reckoning, was traveling closer to 50), I asked him to help me unravel more mysteries of Chinese highway law enforcement. "Why isn't anybody worried about those police? Why don't they chase anybody and give out tickets?"

That's just not how it's done here, Li said. Occasionally you were hit with an expressway fine when you stopped at the next tollbooth, but ordinarily, unless there had been an accident or some other irregularity, cops wouldn't chase you; tickets just arrived in the mail. Police cars were slow, but the mails were reliable.

He portrayed himself as very straight: "Twenty years ago, I was driving a tractor — I was a model peasant! There were almost no cars in China. I didn't learn to drive until 1988.

"Under Deng Xiaoping, I got lucky because I was uneducated. Educated people think in traditional ways, but Deng said we should take chances." He did, and now he owns the Beijing Fangshan Banbidian Cement Factory, which he started when he was 28. Li Xingjie was mild-mannered and unassuming, but when I later showed Li Lu his business card, she was in awe: "This cellphone prefix means he has had the phone a long time — since they were really expensive. He is very, very rich!"

I considered this as the group reconvened for the last time, just on the other side of a glitzy new toll plaza, its lines limned in neon that had been illuminated as the sun started down. All of the cars in our group — and the majority of cars you see in China, period — were recent models. Almost all the wealth of the drivers was first-generation. The digital cameras, the shiny wristwatches, all of it where I come from said nouveau riche. But the pejorative back home is the normative here: practically every wealthy person is nouveau riche, so the idea is meaningless.

The more instructive comparison, as we stood on this fancy bit of highway surrounded by rice fields and, here and there, people at work in them, was with the rural poor, the peasantry, the hundreds of millions of Chinese who do not yet (and, you imagine, will not in their lifetimes) share this prosperity. Many villages still are not connected to roads at all. When an expressway just south of here was completed last year, I was told sotto voce in Beijing, a series of demonstrations by peasants at a toll plaza delayed its opening. They were angry because the road had taken their land, and this, we are now seeing, is the story all over China: the government itself counted nearly 80,000 mass protests in 2005 alone. The country's economic growth is fantastic, the urban atmosphere heady. . .but then you see through the glass the peasants just in from the countryside, burlap bags at their feet, looking utterly from another planet, representatives of hundreds of millions of others, almost standing still while Zhu and Li zoom on by.


We spent our last night in a four-star high-rise hotel in Luoyang. By the time I made it to our room with my suitcase, Zhu had already welcomed two sleek female "massage therapists" to our quarters; they were perched glamorously on the edge of my bed — legs crossed, lips glossed, high heels dangling — and beckoned me to join them. Zhu chortled with glee at my reticence, and I wondered which part of car travel he enjoyed most: the hours behind the wheel or the hours just after? Certainly, he seemed to take full advantage of all of them.

The end was anticlimactic: everyone was heading back on the same expressway, and Beijing was less than a tank of gas away, so there was no further need to stick together. Chatter on the CB dropped off slowly until the radio was utterly quiet, and in terms of its group dimension anyway, the trip was over.

Li Lu seemed pleased as Zhu's Hyundai eased into the perpetual traffic jam that is Beijing. She confessed that her friends were amazed she had gone on a trip like this: "I'm just a Beijing girl, a taxi girl!" — not a sporting, auto-club type. But Zhu seemed a bit disappointed to be off the open road. He wanted to treat us to dinner at a favorite noodle restaurant near the city center, but first we had to get there.

Creeping along on the highway, we talked about how the Beijing government was trying to control the huge new popularity of cars: one solution to the growing chaos of the streets has been to severely restrict motorcycle use in the city. Zhu thought that was better than Shanghai's fix: trying to cut down on car ownership by setting a high price (presently almost $5,000) on car registration. Trying to ease traffic and cut down on accidents, Shanghai had even banned bicycles from many main streets, news that still amazes me.

A policeman friend of Zhu's met us at the restaurant and, in fact, even picked up the tab. (Zhu's rapport with the department was quite impressive.) I asked him about the street racing I had heard was becoming a problem in the city. Yes, he said, he had heard of it but had not seen it himself, yet. Zhu looked a bit too interested in the subject.

In the coming days, Zhu would entertain me and others at the restaurant-hotel he ran as a hobby on the outskirts of Beijing; likewise, Zhou the lawyer would treat a group of us, including the Wangs of the Citroën, to a fabulous dinner on trendy Houhai Lake. Clearly, nobody wanted the trip to end. ("Was it really that relaxing?" I had asked several of them, many times, after 12-hour days at the wheel; all had sworn that it was.)

An ebullient atmosphere surrounds the automobile in China. You can see the excitement continuing, even growing, as more people buy cars: China now has fewer than seven of them for every thousand people, roughly the same level as the United States had in 1915. Everyone expects the ownership rate to keep growing, which means there could be 130 million vehicles on China's roads by 2020. By 2030, according to one estimate, there could be as many as in the United States.

It is reminiscent of a fading romance in American life, this crush on the automobile, the thrill of car ownership, and it is fun to see. But in this area, American culture seems more mature than Chinese culture, and with the benefit of hindsight and statistics, it is not hard to spot a multicar pileup in the making. While I was in Beijing, the journal Nature reported that the city's air pollution was much worse than previously thought. Concentrations of nitrogen dioxide have increased 50 percent over the past 10 years, and the buildup is accelerating. According to The Wall Street Journal, Beijing's sulfur-dioxide levels in 2004 were more than double New York's, and airborne-particulate levels more than six times as high. Last year China enacted its first comprehensive emissions law, but it is expected to have little effect on the transport sector's copious carbon-dioxide emissions, which by 2030 are expected to exceed those of the United States, the world's largest producer. The nation's growing demands for gasoline make it increasingly our competitor for the finite global supply; by 2030, according to the International Energy Agency, China may be importing as much oil as we do.

On the snail-paced drive back into Beijing, Zhu had passed through a zone on the edge of town that had been bulldozed and was being rebuilt as upper-income, car-friendly suburbs. In fact, this was happening around cities all over China: new gated communities, new themed enclaves, all for the car-owning class. What was conspicuously missing was a corresponding investment in mass transit, in public spaces and public access. And, in heavy traffic at the end of a tiring trip, it was easy to worry that the Chinese, rather than charting an innovative, alternate route into the automotive era, were on their way down a road that looks a little too familiar.

Ted Conover, a distinguished writer in residence at New York University, is at work on a book about roads.


[+/-] show/hide this post